



UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE (UNFCCC)

28TH CONFERENCE OF PARTIES (COP28)

ROADMAP FOR ZIMBABWE



MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT, CLIMATE AND WILDLIFE

OCTOBER 2023

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

- 1.1** The 2023 United Nations on Climate Change Conference (UNFCCC) will convene from 30 November to 12 December 2023 in Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE). It will comprise: the 28th meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP28); the fifth meeting of the COP serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA 5). The Government of Zimbabwe once chaired COP2 in 1996. The 28th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The demands for COP27 was that the next conference will need to deliver bolder action to keep 1.5 degrees in sight, avoid even greater losses and damages and accelerate a just transition to an economy that works for people and the planet.
- 1.2** The Regional Climate Weeks will build momentum ahead of COP28 in the United Arab Emirates and the conclusion of the first global stocktake, designed to chart the way for fulfilling the Paris Agreement's key goals. The first of the events will be:
 - 1.2.1 Africa Climate Week from 4-8 September in Nairobi, Kenya. Middle East
 - 1.2.2 North Africa Climate Week is scheduled for 9-12 October in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
 - 1.2.3 Latin America and Caribbean Climate Week will take place from 23-27 October in Panama City.
 - 1.2.4 Asia-Pacific Climate Week will be in Johor, Malaysia.
- 1.3** Global political leaders are expected to meet and agreed on several climate issues, with dialogues and agreements with private sector, representatives of Non-Governmental Organisations, Local Communities and Indigenous People, Women, Youths, Children and related groups are invited to COP28. Many other people also attend to try to influence the outcome, as accredited and non-accredited participants, with over 70,000 participants expected in the UAE.

2.0 GUIDING PRINCIPLES AND PRIORITIES

- 2.1** Zimbabwe is firmly committed to a multilateral approach to the global challenge of climate change. The country ascribe to the full implementation of the Convention and its Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement and joins other African countries, Small Islands States, the global South, and developing countries seeking solutions to climate change, as they are disproportionately affected by the adverse impact of climate change.
- 2.2** The guiding principles to Zimbabwe's at COP28 are:
 - 2.2.1 Climate justice for all global people;
 - 2.2.2 Fair and equal opportunities in the transition to a low carbon global economy.
 - 2.2.3 National sovereignty in the just transition.
 - 2.2.4 Consistency in common by differentiated responsibility.

2.3 Priorities for Zimbabwe, include the following:

- 2.3.1 **Loss and damage** was agreed at COP27, as an urgent action. Zimbabwe places it highly and expects action at COP28.
- 2.3.2 **Climate finance** and enhancing carbon trade through compliance and the voluntary markets be a mechanism to unlock finance, including for a just transition and overcoming all the barriers to climate finance.
- 2.3.3 **Adaptation** is an essential element of any outcome to protect people, livelihoods and ecosystems.
- 2.3.4 **Mitigation** aimed at reducing emissions towards the 1.5 degrees by 2030, remains a key priority taking into account different national circumstances.
- 2.3.5 **Sectoral issues: energy** in the just transition must be explicit, given that some parties have turned away from obligations, while support for technology transfer does not feature with the same level of support; food, agriculture and water were watered down at COP27 and are a priority for Zimbabwe

2.4 Further areas of concern for Zimbabwe:

- 2.4.1 That many issues remain hanging and unresolved with each year matters being referred to the inter-sessional bodies and decisions perpetuating. At COP28, we need to resolve this matter, as parties are evading making decisions
- 2.4.2 Parity and balance between mitigation and adaptation and means of implementation is a cornerstone for progress in the negotiations and for the expected results.
- 2.4.3 Many decisions are being postponed by some 4-5 years, and it is not clear why parties cannot conclude these, as these perpetuates the climate crisis, when new issues emerge and solutions needed.
- 2.4.4 Research efforts on new areas of concern must be supported to enhance knowledge. The Reports by the Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) provides key benchmarks, but are not enough to address the concern of parties from developing countries.
- 2.4.5 As a party, Zimbabwe is open to dialogue and this must not be an end. There is a need to get to work in resolving the many climate challenges and time is of essence, if we are to meet the 1.5 degrees target by 2030.

3.0 COP28 SPECIFICATIONS & NEGOTIATIONS


3.1 What is COP28?

- 3.1.1 COP28 refers to the 28th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The UNFCCC is an international treaty aimed at addressing global warming and reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
- 3.1.2 This conference is thus a gathering of representatives from countries that have signed the treaty to discuss and negotiate ways to address climate change. 154 countries signed the UNFCCC in June 1992, agreeing to combat harmful human impacts on the climate.
- 3.1.3 COP meetings have been held (almost) annually to discuss solutions, implementation achievements, and monitor what progress has been made. Each COP is usually referred to by its number in the series, e.g., COP28 is the 28th COP meeting.
- 3.1.4 Each year a different country becomes the COP president, in charge of organising and running that year's meeting. Usually this means that the host city moves each year, too.
- 3.1.5 Any new agreements which are made at COP tend to be named after the host city, e.g., the 2015 Paris Agreement or the 2021 Glasgow Climate Pact. The 2023 UN Climate Change Conference will convene from 30 November to 12 December 2023 at the Expo City Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE) and will comprise the:
- 28th meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP 28);
 - 5th meeting of the COP serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA 5);
 - 18th meeting of the COP serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP 18);
 - 59th meeting of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI 59); and
 - 59th meeting of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA 59).

3.2 What is the Roadmap to COP28?

- 3.2.1 The roadmap for COP28 is a clear plan meant to outline steps to be followed in the whole COP28 preparatory process. This roadmap covers key actions that need to be taken, timelines and milestones.
- 3.2.2 Main purpose of defining these steps is to help guide decision making, resource allocation and communicate progress to stakeholders including identifying potential roadblocks and risks for corrective action. Figure 3.2 is a flow chat summarising the steps to be followed in the built up to COP28 and beyond:

Figure 3.2: Step by Step Road to COP28



3.3 What elements of COP27 and SB58 are to be Adopted for COP28 and Why?

3.3.1 Just Transition

- The concept of a ‘just transition’ recognizes that a shift to a more sustainable economy can have significant impacts on workers and communities that are currently dependent on fossil fuels.
- COP 27 established a work programme on just transition pathways to achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement of reducing temperature rise.
- Parties to the Convention are called upon to transit to cleaner Energy.
- It also outlines agreed pathways to encompass energy, socio-economic, workforces, and other dimensions encompassing nationally defined development priorities and social protection.
- Acknowledges that Just Transition threatens Jobs and requires funding to retool the affected.
- SB 58 and COP28 to focus discussion on framing of the Just Transition Work Program ensuring that it is comprehensive considering different pathways across economies. Modalities, timelines and priority areas to be also explored.

Country Position on Just Transition

Zimbabwe has some fundamental concerns relating to the global climate change mitigation agenda. These relate to the call for swift action to transit from fossil-fuels to renewable energy forms and the consequent impacts of implementation of these response measures. As a result of de-carbonization of the sectors through phasing out of coal or implementation of mandatory use of renewable forms of energy, and transition to electric vehicles among other measures, there will be economic losses, and the consequent impacts on the workforce that will be redundant thereafter as well as possible value chain disruptions.

Zimbabwe’s position is to have an agreement on Just Transition that creates funding opportunities for the Just Transition Work Programme, accessible to developing countries in a transparent and just manner. Several of our capital assets will be devalued before the end of their economic lifetime, culminating into Stranding of these Assets. These potential ‘Stranded Assets’ include coal-fired electricity generation plants, oil fields, to some extent even some natural gas resources. It is now almost certain that exploitation of the same will be strongly discouraged in the near future with a possibility of phase-down timelines being unachievable in the short term and may have the potential consequences of derailing our economic development. External demand for coal will eventually decline as share of renewables in the global energy mix increases.

3.3.2 Global Stocktake (GST)

- The Global Stocktake is the process that aims to assess the world’s collective progress towards achieving the Paris Agreement’s long-term goals. The First Global Stocktake is ongoing and will conclude at COP28 in 2023 with outcomes to spur countries to take more ambitious

action across all elements of climate action, including: enhanced adaptation and resilience, setting new ambitious commitments to equitably phase out fossil fuels, scale up renewable energy and adopt 1.5 °C-aligned national climate plans in 2025.

- The global stocktake will provide updated information with regards to the means of implementation in the form of climate finance, technology development, transfer and related human capacity development.

Country Position on the Global Stock Take

Zimbabwe and Africa’s position in the GST process is for a fair and balanced outcome across the three thematic areas of: mitigation, adaptation and means of implementation. Further, stocktake should reflect equity with regards to climate action and support.

Zimbabwe continues to meet its obligations under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement and was invited to present to all Parties at the SB58 physically and virtually, a summary of its First Biennial Update Report (BUR) submitted to the UNFCCC Secretariat in September 2021. This BUR was also subjected to Technical Expert Review in the past two years. The First Biennial Update Report was well received and acknowledged as reflecting completeness and transparency as required by the provisions of the Paris Agreement.

Zimbabwe calls upon other Parties especially the developed country Parties to also follow suit and present their BURs. Some developed and countries with economies in transition, especially the eastern European countries have failed to account for their greenhouse gases citing the geopolitical problems as one of the major reasons for not meeting their reporting obligations under the Climate Change Convention and the Paris Agreement. Most of the African countries are lagging behind.

In preparation for COP28, a series of engagements will be held to prepare for the political phase of the GST at COP28. These will include the in-country engagements, the Africa Climate Week and Summit, 4-8 September 2023 and the UN Secretary General’s Climate Summit 20 September 2023 in New York.

- The June session marked the 3rd and final Technical Dialogue of the first GST. The 3rd technical dialogue of the GST is structured in three main thematic areas: (i) mitigation, (ii) adaptation and (iii) the means of implementation.

- The deliberations from the Technical Dialogue will be compiled into a Factual Synthesis Report (FSR) as an input to the last phase of the GST, the Political Phase to be held at COP28.

3.3.3 Response Measures

- The potential impacts of “response measures” (measures to mitigate emissions and address climate change) on countries’ economies are recognized in the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement. In 2011, a Forum was set up under the UNFCCC to understand and address these.
- The Katowice Committee of Experts on the Impacts of the Implementation of Response Measures (KCI) was created to support the Forum’s work in 2018. The process of understanding the impacts of mitigation actions, e.g., the economic impacts of phasing out of coal or the entire transition to renewable forms of energy are still under discussion.
- The COP and CMA decisions in Egypt welcome the annual reports of the KCI. The review will continue under the Forum at SB58. Furthermore, the SB58 will conduct the mid-term review with the aim of completing the review at COP28. Consultations will be held in-session and virtually throughout the year to review and assess the work of the KCI.
- The country has several infrastructure and assets which may be stranded due to the various mitigation actions, e.g., coal mines.

3.3.4 Mitigation Work Program

- In Glasgow in 2021, parties decided to establish a work programme to urgently scale up mitigation ambition and implementation, referred to as the Mitigation Work Programme (MWP). This was a recognition that, without full implementation of NDCs already submitted and strengthening climate ambition, the 1.5°C warming limit would become out of reach. Progress in Sharm El-Sheikh was slow due to divergences on such issues as guiding principles, scope and timeline for the process.
- Some developing countries, the large emerging economies in particular, were concerned with suggestions by developed countries that they should bear a greater burden of emission reductions, seeing this as an attempt to re-write the principle of

common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Related to this, they objected to an attempt to identify new categories of countries by introducing new language such as “major emitters”. After extensive discussions at COP27, the outcome finally reached was a decision that reaffirms the nationally determined nature of NDCs and the Paris Agreement’s temperature goal and to avoid any overlap between the MWP and the NDC process, confirming that the objective of the MWP is to urgently scale up mitigation ambition and implementation

- Discussions on the operationalization of the MWP continued at SB58 through focused exchanges of views, information, and ideas, and capacity building in order for the outcomes not to be prescriptive or punitive, but facilitative and respectful of national sovereignty and national circumstances, and not to result in new targets or goals.
- Zimbabwe, having a huge potential for renewable forms of energy makes this MWP an issue of interest to pursue at COP28, taking into that Developed countries are obligated under the Convention to provide means to developing countries to mitigate with adaptation co-benefits, where possible. The issue of finance should be given precedence as we discuss climate change mitigation.

3.3.5 Global Goal on Adaptation

- At COP 26/CMA 3 in Glasgow, parties had tasked the SBs with carrying out a two-year “Glasgow-Sharm-el-Sheikh Work Programme on the Global Goal on Adaptation,” designed to clarify and quantify the “Global Goal on Adaptation” (GGA) established by Article 7.1 of the Paris Agreement.
- At COP 27, developing country groups pushed for the establishment of a concrete GGA framework. In contrast, several developed countries and groups questioned the need to implement a comprehensive framework at COP 27, and advocated for another year of work before establishing a framework. COP 27 and CMA 4 did not reach consensus on adopting new adaptation finance agenda items.
- Climate change adaptation is key to Zimbabwe to protect, preserve, conserve and as several of her economic sectors are negatively affected by climate change. The need to improve national resilience to climate impacts drives the country to push for serious consideration of this agenda item, paying particular attention on addressing adaptation financing gaps as identified in the National Adaptation Plans.

3.3.6 Loss and Damage

- *Background:* the Santiago Network on Loss and Damage (SNLD) was established in 2019 to catalyse technical assistance for loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change. In Glasgow, parties agreed its functions and decided that it will be provided with funds to support technical assistance to implement relevant approaches to avert, minimise and address loss and damage. Parties also decided to further develop its institutional arrangements.
- *Institutional arrangements:* COP27 adopted the structure and institutional arrangements for the Santiago Network as well as agreed on the Terms of Reference and procedure for the selection of the host institution for the Secretariat of the Santiago Network.
 - The COP invited expressions of interest for hosting of the Santiago Network, an evaluation panel conducted an evaluation of the two bids received from (i) Caribbean Development Bank and (ii) a consortium of United Nations office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) and United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS).
 - At the June 2023 intersessional meetings, parties considered the two bids but an agreement could not be reached on the host institution of the Santiago Network. A procedural conclusion was made to defer the selection of a host institution to COP28. Further, Parties drafted the elements of the MoU between the UNFCCC Secretariat and the selected host for the Santiago Network to ensure that views and expectations of parties on the operation of the Secretariat are reflected in the hosting agreement.
- *Funding Arrangements and the Fund for Loss and Damage:* the 2nd Glasgow Dialogue was held at the 58th Session of the SBI. The discussions built on the COP27 decision to establish a funding mechanism and a fund for loss and damage. In preparation for COP28, Parties are engaging in various sessions such as the scoping exercise for climate related disasters towards producing country level disaster profiles to inform the type of technical assistance required and the modalities for the loss and damage fund. The deliberations will feed into the work of the Transitional Committee work throughout the year towards a decision to operationalize the Fund at COP28.

3.3.7 Climate Finance

- The Climate finance goal was set at \$100 billion and has not been realized. Discussion have established that the goal was inadequate. SB58 and COP28 will therefore be addressing the major deficit in climate finance from developed countries and making substantial progress in negotiating the new climate finance goal to be agreed upon in 2024.
- As Zimbabwe positions to access international climate finance, COP28 should deliver a decision that should see the developed countries expediting the provision of USD 100 billion per year and to honour their Glasgow/COP27 commitment to double their adaptation finance to developing countries.

3.3.8 Carbon Markets

- Article 6 of the Paris Agreement allows parties to cooperate using voluntary market-based and non-market-based approaches in order to implement their NDCs. Paragraphs 2 – 7 of this Article outline two different market-based approaches:
 - Internationally transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMOs) between two or more parties (Art. 6.2 PA);
 - Creation of a central mechanism, governed by a Supervisory Body (Art. 6.4 PA). This mechanism will enable generation of emissions reductions units, pursuant to methodologies approved by the Supervisory Body;
 - A framework of non-market approaches through agreed ground rules for the implementation of this approach.
- COP27 deferred decisions to future sessions that include: a) special circumstances of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS), which will be addressed at COP 28/CMA 5; and (b) the question of whether “emissions avoidance” will be considered under Article 6.2, which was deferred to the CMA 6.
- COP28 will finalise Article 6 and fully operationalize Carbon Trading under the Paris Agreement in 2024.

3.4 What Issues were watered Down from COP27 and Why?

3.4.1 Loss and Damage became the final commonly agreed decision at COP27, with a lot of areas needing clarifications. Negotiations for a fund that would compensate developing countries for the loss and damage that climate change has wrought dominated the negotiations. In the early hours of Sunday the 21st November 2022, in the morning, well

past the deadline of the 18th of November 2022, member states agreed to establish such a fund – a win for developing countries. *However, who will pay and how this financial assistance will be delivered to help countries like Zimbabwe recover from climate disasters remains to be negotiated in 2023.*

- 3.4.2 The oil and gas-producing nations became more influential at COP27, undermining the negotiations. World leaders preoccupied with spiralling energy prices and the escalating cost of living were reluctant to act boldly on fossil fuels.
- 3.4.3 The COP27 agreement failed to go beyond the 2021 Glasgow climate pact’s promise to “phase down unabated coal power”, despite the Indian proposal that all fossil fuels should be phased out. The text also announced no new targets or commitments, threatening the goal of limiting global temperature rise to 1.5°C, established seven years ago in the Paris agreement. Instead, there was a request for new country pledges, or nationally determined contributions (NDCs), for COP28 – another year’s delay.
- 3.4.4 Developing countries entered COP27 hoping for progress on three fronts: climate finance and the delivery of US\$100 billion (£84.6 billion) a year as promised in 2009, global decarbonisation, and recognition of the responsibility of developed countries to pay for loss and damage.

3.5 What New Issues Emerged? Who Pushed for the Issues and Why?

- 3.5.1 Climate as a human right emerged as a key issue at COP27, and specifically for developing and within the context of frustrating experiences of limited funding for climate action.
- 3.5.2 Climate change threatens and violate the rights to life, adequate food, safe drinking water and sanitation, the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, including sexual and reproductive health, adequate housing, self-determination, just and favourable conditions of work, development, the right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment and livelihoods, as well as the right to education and cultural rights.
- 3.5.3 Climate change contributes to adverse impacts on women and girls and against groups in marginalized situations, such as migrants, minorities, indigenous peoples, people of African descent, older persons and persons with disabilities including albinism.
- 3.5.4 Climate change is exacerbating the risk of other human rights violations, including excessive use of force in the context of policing climate refugees and others who become stateless.
- 3.5.5 Mainstreaming climate change into human rights will feature prominently in global climate negotiations, obligations, targets, planning, tools financing and actions across the

globe. The full and effective participation of local communities and indigenous peoples in the COP process is vital.

- 3.5.6 There are 3 vital questions for engagement that is: (a) What are the obligations of States under international law to ensure the protection of the climate system and other parts of the environment from anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases; (b) What are the legal consequences under these obligations; (c) how are present and future generations protected from the adverse effects of climate change? It is not clear how this will impact on the obligations of each and every Party under the Paris Agreement especially with respect to non-compliance.

3.6 What was the strategy for getting Zimbabwe issues adopted at COP27?

- 3.6.1 Climate change require that “we think globally, but act locally”. In this regard, climate change issues at the local level are integrated into the global negotiation platform and debated through systematic groupings that have been established under the United Nations.
- 3.6.2 Most of the climate change issues that affect Zimbabwe are similar to the impacts felt by other African nations. The Africa Group of Negotiators collects all the national climate change concerns, and synthesises them into an African Position that is shared with Group of 77 and China as some of the Africa Group climate change issues are also similar to other developing countries in other continents.
- 3.6.3 Zimbabwe has been involved in coordination of various thematic areas in the Africa Group and in the G77/China.

3.7 What Must be the New Strategy for COP28?

- 3.7.1 Zimbabwe remains committed to a multilateral approach to the climate change agenda and urges the full implementation of the Convention and its Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement. Our priority is to get a fair share from the opportunities of the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) and the financing that will be availed for transitioning to a low carbon global economy. These collective commitments have proven to be the most difficult to implement, since the landmark Paris Accord of 2015.
- 3.7.2 Zimbabwe, will continue to table our expectations in line with other African countries, recalling that our issues of climate adaption still remain a planning ambition not supported by means of implementation, with the same applying to mitigation actions under the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and the Low Emission Development Strategy.

- 3.7.3 Rolling out of the National Adaptation Plan (NAP), the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and the Low Emission Development Strategy is critical at this stage. NAP has quantified the adaptation needs which would inform discussions on the GGA. This, aggregated with other countries' needs will provide verified information on the adaptation gap of Africa.
- 3.7.4 Zimbabwe's country's mitigation portfolio (greenhouse gases, mitigation actions on the ground, challenges and needs) will enrich discussions on the mitigation agenda items and negotiations on the means of implementation.
- 3.7.5 The Carbon Credit Framework and the Statutory Instrument on Carbon Trading that are in place will further equip Zimbabwe in Article 6 negotiations especially on the country's needs to strengthen further the implementation of carbon trading. This may be focusing on the resource needs for developing the carbon registries, rolling out of Article 6, and capacity building associated with this Article. The inclusion of loss and damage in the Zimbabwe carbon trading share of proceeds makes it inviting, hunc and quite insync with discussions at a global level on the need to urgently operationalise the Loss and Damage Fund agreed upon at COP28.

3.8 How are we Going to Push the Agenda?

- 3.8.1 The agenda of the COP and SBs covers most of the climate change issues of interest to Zimbabwe. These include, among others, Carbon Trade, Finance, Adaptation, Mitigation, Loss and Damage., and a variety of sectors such as energy, transport, agriculture, food security, water, forests, wield technology information, governance, etc. If Zimbabwe will write to the UNFCCC Secretariat presenting the submission with justification of the submission on any issue of interest.
- 3.8.2 The Secretariat will consider submissions and during the plenary opening of COP28, there are calls for the adoption of the agenda, and any changes can be done. If the submission is accepted, it will be submitted to the COP Plenary at the beginning of the conference for Parties to deliberate on before its inclusion in the agenda. It may be accepted or rejected depending on the merit of the submission.

4.0 DOMINANT THEMES AT COP28

4.1 Loss and Damage

- 4.1.1 The loss and damage agenda item under the UNFCCC COP28 remains crucial for the Africa Group of Negotiators and Zimbabwe.

- 4.1.2 The loss and damage agenda item continue to recognize the ongoing and increasing impacts of climate change, particularly on vulnerable countries and communities. It highlights the need for immediate actions to address the unavoidable and unavoidable negative impacts of climate change.
- 4.1.3 Loss and damage intends to help provide support to vulnerable communities that are already experiencing the impacts of climate change or are likely to do so in the future. It can help address the loss of livelihoods, displacement, and food insecurity.
- 4.1.4 It provides a platform for dialogue and cooperation about loss and damage, share experiences, and collaborate on solutions. Such dialogue and cooperation can help enhance international solidarity and collective decision-making under the UNFCCC.
- 4.1.5 It complements mitigation and adaptation efforts under the UNFCCC and recognizes that there will still be loss and damage that cannot be avoided.
- 4.1.6 Strengthens the implementation of the Paris Agreement for the development of specific strategies and actions to strengthen the implementation of the Paris Agreement, particularly for vulnerable communities. At COP28 it remains an essential and strategic agenda item for the Zimbabwe Group of Negotiators.

4.2 Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA)

- 4.2.1 The Global Goal on Adaptation, which was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 2021, recognizes the critical role of food systems in building resilience to the impacts of climate change.
- 4.2.2 The Goal includes a specific target related to food systems and transformation, which states that, “*by 2030, increase the resilience of food systems and their capacity to adapt to climate change, with a focus on small-scale food producers, women, youth and indigenous peoples, through the implementation of climate-resilient agricultural practices, strengthening of local food systems, and promotion of sustainable and diversified livelihoods.*” This target emphasizes the need to build resilience in food systems to the impacts of climate change, particularly for vulnerable populations such as small-scale food producers, women, youth, and indigenous peoples.
- 4.2.3 The GGA also highlights the importance of implementing climate-resilient agricultural practices, strengthening local food systems, and promoting sustainable and diversified livelihoods.
- 4.2.4 It recognises the critical role land use and agro-ecology play in building resilience to the impacts of climate change. The Goal includes a specific target related to land use and agro-ecology, which states that, “*by 2030, increase the resilience of land use systems and their capacity to adapt to climate change, with a focus on agro-ecological approaches, conservation and restoration*

of ecosystems, and sustainable land management practices, including addressing the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation.” This target emphasizes the need to build resilience in land use systems to the impacts of climate change by promoting agro-ecological approaches, conservation and restoration of ecosystems, and sustainable land management practices.

4.2.5 It also highlights the importance of addressing the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation, which are significant sources of greenhouse gas emissions and contribute to climate change.

4.3 Mitigation

4.3.1 Accelerate Emissions Reduction

4.3.1.1 The acceleration of emissions reduction under the UNFCCC COP28 agenda remains key for Zimbabwe considering its revised Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC). The urgency arises from the fact that, the latest scientific reports (IPCC, 2023) indicate that the world is not on track to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement, and that urgent action is needed to avoid the worst impacts of climate change.

1.1.1.1 Accelerating emissions reduction is essential to limit global warming to 1.5°C

above pre-industrial levels, as called for in the Paris Agreement. The Zimbabwe Group of Negotiators ought to understand that the current pledges made by countries under the Paris Agreement are not sufficient to achieve the

Zimbabwe’s Needs Towards COP28 and Beyond

- **Knowledge:** the understanding that accelerating emissions reduction can help to address the issue of equity, as it is often the most vulnerable and marginalized communities that are most affected by climate change. By reducing emissions quickly and effectively, these communities can be better protected from the impacts of climate change
- **Innovation:** Accelerating emissions reduction can help to drive innovation in clean energy technologies and sustainable practices, creating new opportunities for economic growth and job creation especially for Annex II Parties like Zimbabwe
- **Leadership:** This is with the understanding that, accelerating emissions reduction under the COP28 agenda can help to demonstrate leadership on the global stage, encouraging other countries and stakeholders especially those from Annex I to take more ambitious action on climate change.

necessary emissions reductions and therefore, accelerating emissions reduction under the COP28 agenda can help to increase the ambition of these pledges and ensure that they are in line with the latest science.

1.1.1.2 Overall, accelerating emissions reduction under the UNFCCC COP28 agenda remains key to achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement and avoiding the worst impacts of climate change. At COP28, it is essential that countries and stakeholders work together to increase ambition and take urgent action to reduce emissions and transition to a low-carbon economy and globe.

1.1.1 Energy Transition

1.1.1.1 The energy sector is one of the largest contributors to Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions, accounting for around two-thirds of global emissions. Transitioning to a low-carbon energy system is therefore essential to reduce emissions and mitigate the impacts of climate change.

1.1.1.2 *The Zimbabwe position is therefore that, transitioning to a low-carbon energy system can create new economic opportunities and jobs in clean energy technologies and sustainable practices.* This can help to drive economic growth and support the transition to a more sustainable and equitable future.

1.1.1.3 Energy security, with the background understanding that, transitioning to a low-carbon energy system has great potential to enhance energy security by reducing reliance on fossil fuels and increasing the use of renewable energy sources. This can help to reduce the risks associated with energy price volatility and supply disruptions especially considering that Zimbabwe is already experiencing deficiencies in energy supply.

1.1.1.4 The transition to a low-carbon energy system can also have significant health benefits by reducing air pollution and improving public health outcomes. This again is with the background understanding that Zimbabwe is currently battling with a huge medical bill overstressing treasury capacity in view of competing needs across the economy.

1.1.1.5 The transition to a low-carbon energy system requires international cooperation and collaboration, as many countries rely on imported fossil fuels and face similar challenges in transitioning to a low-carbon economy. Zimbabwe therefore fully understands and takes the UNFCCC COP28 agenda as an important forum for countries and stakeholders to work together to accelerate the energy transition and achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement

1.1.1.6 Overall, energy transition under the UNFCCC COP28 agenda remains key to achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement and addressing the urgent challenge

of climate change. It is therefore essential that countries and stakeholders work together to accelerate the transition to a low-carbon energy system and build a more sustainable and equitable future for all.

1.2 Mobilisation of Finance

- 1.2.1 Climate finance remains a critical issue under the COP28 negotiations with main discussions centered on developed countries meeting the USD 100 billion goal, set at COP15.
- 1.2.2 Zimbabwe and the African Group of Nations, will continue to call for the need for new, additional, predictable, adequate and non-concessional climate finance from developed countries for climate change mitigation and adaptation in developing countries.
- 1.2.3 The 1st National Adaptation Plan (NAP) and accompanying National Adaptation Finance Strategy highlight the need for USD 10.3 billion to implement adaptation options across seven priority sectors until the year 2030.
- 1.2.4 The Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) for climate finance, established at COP26, also remains a pivotal on new finance goals reflecting developing countries' evolving needs and priorities. It is envisioned that this goal should be set prior to the 2025 deadline, identifying the quantum, qualitative and quantitative goals, timeframes, interlinkages with other mechanisms especially that of the new Loss and Damage Funding mechanism, as well as sources of climate finance and the funding instruments used to deliver them.
- 1.2.5 Zimbabwe is also in the process of developing its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) and Long-Term Low Greenhouse Gas Emission Development Strategy (LT-LEDS) Investment Plan which will guide investment and implementation of mitigation options from 2024-2050. It is against this background that setting a realistic, needs based goal under the NCQG is important for Zimbabwe as well.
- 1.2.6 The importance of setting a clear definition of climate finance is also important, under the functions of the Standing Committee on Finance, to guide technical discussions on the development of the new goal, the Loss and Damage Fund and adequately track and monitor climate finance flows in a transparent manner.

1.3 Carbon Credit Policy Development in Zimbabwe

- 1.3.1 Zimbabwe developed its Carbon Credit Framework will be launched at COP28.
- 1.3.2 The staff of the Designated National Authority (DNA) will exhibit and run an administrative office at COP28 through considering and uploading potential projects by partners. The DNA shall be working closely with the United Nations Framework

Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to ensure that Zimbabwe's carbon credit framework is aligned with global best practices.

- 1.3.3 Zimbabwe Investment Development Authority and the DNA will jointly exhibit at the Zimbabwe Climate Pavilion.

1.4 Science and Technology

- 1.4.1 Science and technology issues to be considered for discussion and positions at UNFCCC COP28 are numerous and varied especially for Zimbabwe and other developing countries highly impacted by climate change.
- 1.4.2 The latest scientific findings from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) show worst case scenarios on climate change, such as extreme weather events, loss of biodiversity, wild fires, extreme high temperatures etc.
- 1.4.3 The use of carbon removal technologies, such as direct air capture and carbon sequestration, will be discussed at COP28. These technologies are seen as a way to remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and help to mitigate the impacts of climate change. Applicability and affordability of these technologies in the African context will thus be worth pursuing.
- 1.4.4 The transition to renewable energy sources, such as solar and wind power, will be a key topic at COP28. Countries will discuss their progress towards meeting their renewable energy targets and how to accelerate the transition to a low-carbon economy.
- 1.4.5 As the impacts of climate change become more severe, countries will need to invest in adaptation technologies to protect vulnerable communities. This includes technologies such as early warning systems for extreme weather events and drought-resistant crops.

1.5 Climate Empowerment and Capacity Building

- 1.5.1 The 4-year action plan for the Glasgow Work Programme on Action for Climate Empowerment (ACE) is aimed at strengthening integration of ACE into national climate-related policies & plans; enhancing regional collaboration through dialogues and ACE hubs; promoting the development of regional and local networks and platforms that support ACE activities at all levels; and, inclusion of youth, children, women, indigenous peoples and persons with disabilities in climate action. Focus for COP 28 will be on operationalisation of the Action Plan.
- 1.5.2 This platform will also enable the identification of financial mechanisms to support ACE implementation in Parties as well as exploring the possibilities of establishing an ACE

Coordination Platform which facilitates coordination and management of ACE in all Parties.

- 1.5.3 Capacity gaps and needs still exist in developing countries and there are calls for developed country Parties to increase support for long-term country-driven capacity-building interventions to enhance the effectiveness, success and sustainability of those interventions.
- 1.5.4 The Paris Committee on Capacity Building (PCCB) was established to identify capacity gaps and needs and potential solutions, including enhancing the coherence and coordination of capacity-building efforts related to climate change.
- 1.5.5 A toolkit was launched at COP 27 to assess capacity building gaps and needs to implement the Paris Agreement. The focus will be on use of the toolkit, tapping into experiences from those who used it. The PCCB will also be giving updates on implementation of its workplan (202102024).
- 1.5.6 The 2023 focus area of the Paris Committee on Capacity-building is on capacity-building support for adaptation, with a focus on addressing gaps and needs related to formulating and implementing national adaptation plans. The country having worked on the National Adaptation Plan, the focus will be on implementation.
- 1.5.7 The PCCB will be reviewed next year at COP 29 and preparations for the review have started at SB 58 continuing to COP 28. Parties are invited to submit their views on the review and suggest ways to strengthen the mandate of the PCCB.
- 1.5.8 Zimbabwe needs to implement capacity building projects and ensure the strengthening the capacity of institutions in Zimbabwe to conform to the Transparency Requirements of the Paris Agreement.

2.0 EMERGING AND SECTORAL ISSUES AT COPS

2.1 Land-use and Agro-ecology

- 2.1.1 Land use and agro-ecology is highly relevant to Zimbabwe, as the country faces significant challenges related to land use and agriculture in the face of climate change.
- 2.1.2 Deforestation and forest degradation are significant challenges in Zimbabwe especially in rural areas where communities impacted by climate change now resort to forests for food and livelihoods, fuelwood, timber, and other resources. This has significant implications for carbon emissions, biodiversity, and other ecosystem services.
- 2.1.3 Promoting conservation and restoration of ecosystems is critical to addressing the impacts of climate change on land use and agriculture in Zimbabwe. This can involve measures such as reforestation, afforestation, and restoration of degraded lands.

- 2.1.4 Promoting sustainable land management practices, such as conservation agriculture and sustainable forestry, is critical to building resilience in Zimbabwe's land use systems. These practices can help to improve soil health, increase water efficiency, and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
- 2.1.5 Addressing the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation, such as unsustainable land use practices and illegal logging, is critical to promoting sustainable land use and agriculture in Zimbabwe.

2.2 Food Systems Transformation

- 2.2.1 The Global Goal on Adaptation's thrust on food systems and transformation is highly relevant to Zimbabwe, as the country has had food security and climate change in the past and is finding answers through a raft of strategies, which remain a risk due to climate change.
- 2.2.2 Zimbabwe is highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change affecting food security, particularly in rural areas where communities rely on rain-fed agriculture. Changes in rainfall patterns, increased temperatures, and extreme weather events have all led to reduced crop yields, soil degradation, and increased pest and disease pressure.
- 2.2.3 Improving the resilience of food systems to the impacts of climate change is critical to addressing food security challenges in Zimbabwe. There is therefore urgent need to put in place measures such as promoting climate-resilient agricultural practices, strengthening local food systems, and promoting sustainable and diversified livelihoods to help militate against the impacts of climate change and reinforce resilience of communities.
- 2.2.4 Small-scale food producers make up a significant proportion of Zimbabwe's agricultural sector. Ironic enough, this group tops high in terms of vulnerability to the impacts of climate change. Supporting these producers through measures such as capacity building, access to finance, and market linkages is critical to building resilience in the country's food systems.
- 2.2.5 Women, youth, and people living with disability are also vulnerable to the impacts of climate change on food security in Zimbabwe. Investing in and promoting their participation in decision-making processes related to food systems and providing support for their livelihoods is critical to building resilience.
- 2.2.6 Promoting agro-ecological approaches to agriculture, such as conservation agriculture and sustainable land management practices, is critical to building resilience in Zimbabwe's food systems. These approaches fully supported, properly operationalised have great

potential to improve soil health, increase water efficiency, and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

2.2.7 The Global Goal on Adaptation's thrust on food systems and transformation will require a coordinated effort from the government, private sector, and civil society to develop and implement effective policies and programs, mobilize investment and financing, and build capacity in food and climate change issues.

2.2.8 Overall, food and agriculture are critical issues for addressing climate change in Zimbabwe, and there is significant potential for the country to promote climate-resilient agriculture, reduce greenhouse gas emissions from agriculture, and improve food security and nutrition through effective policies and programs. Achieving this will require a lot of international cooperation critical in addressing the impacts of climate change on food security in Zimbabwe. This includes support for adaptation and mitigation measures, capacity building, and financing for sustainable agriculture policy environment and practices.

Zimbabwe's Experiences

Experience from the past years has proven that food and agriculture are closely linked to climate change in Zimbabwe. Evidence is available to prove that climate change has caused significant impacts on the country's food security, agricultural production, and rural livelihoods and therefore ought to be a key area of priority at COP28 especially following the adoption of the Sharm El Sheik Work Programme on Agriculture at COP27. Here are some key points related to food and climate change in Zimbabwe that ought to be considered and reflected in the country position paper:

- (i) Vulnerability to climate change: Zimbabwe is highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change on food security, particularly in rural areas where communities rely on rain-fed agriculture. Changes in rainfall patterns, increased temperatures, and extreme weather events have led to reduced crop yields, soil degradation, and increased pest and disease pressure.
- (ii) Adaptation measures: Implementing adaptation measures that promote climate-resilient agriculture is critical to addressing the impacts of climate change on food security in Zimbabwe. This can involve measures such as crop diversification, conservation agriculture through upscaling of the Pfumvudza/Intwasa programme, and the use of drought-resistant crop varieties.
- (iii) Mitigation measures: Agriculture is a significant source of greenhouse gas emissions in Zimbabwe, particularly through land use and land use change, deforestation and livestock production. Implementing mitigation measures that reduce emissions from agriculture, such as sustainable land management practices and improved livestock management, can help to address the impacts of climate change on food security while also contributing to global efforts to mitigate climate change.
- (iv) Nutrition: Climate change can also have significant impacts on the nutritional quality of food in Zimbabwe, particularly for vulnerable populations such as children and pregnant women. Promoting diversified and nutritious diets, as well as measures to improve food safety and hygiene, can help to address these impacts.

2.3 Water

- 2.3.1 Water is a critical resource that is affected by climate change in a number of ways. Rising temperatures and changing precipitation patterns are leading to droughts, floods, and water scarcity, which can have significant impacts on food security, human health, and ecosystems. In addition, water management practices, such as irrigation and dam construction, can also contribute to Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions.
- 2.3.2 At COP27 discussions were centred around how countries can better manage their water resources in the face of changing climate. This involved exploring ways to increase the resilience of water systems, improving water use efficiency, and reducing the carbon footprint of water management practices.
- 2.3.3 Discussions also revolved around how to ensure that vulnerable populations, such as those living in arid regions like Zimbabwe and also those living in small island states, have access to climate proofed and climate resilient safe and reliable water sources. Getting into COP28, discussions need to be oriented around finding practical solutions to the challenges posed by climate change, and on promoting sustainable and equitable water management practices that can help to build a more resilient and low carbon future.

2.4 Forests

- 2.4.1 Forestry plays an important role in addressing climate change in Zimbabwe, as forests are a critical carbon sink and provide a range of other ecosystem services that are essential for human well-being. Below is a summary of some key points for consideration as the Zimbabwe Group of Negotiators prepare for UNFCCC COP28.
- 2.4.2 Deforestation and forest degradation are significant challenges in Zimbabwe, particularly in rural areas where communities rely on forests for fuelwood, timber, and other resources. This has significant implications for carbon emissions, biodiversity, and other ecosystem services. To have this status corrected, there is need for the ZGN to place high priority on moving issues related to renewable energy and unlocking of funding to support renewable energy programmes and projects especially in rural areas.
- 2.4.3 Zimbabwe has developed a REDD+ program to address deforestation and forest degradation, as well as to promote sustainable forest management and community participation. The program includes a range of activities, such as forest inventory and monitoring, community-based natural resource management, and sustainable forest management practices.

- 2.4.4 Forests in Zimbabwe have significant potential to sequester carbon, particularly in the country's highland forests and woodlands. Protecting and restoring these forests could help to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and mitigate the impacts of climate change. There is however need to ensure that the carbon trading sector in Zimbabwe is fully regulated with government playing lead role, there is need to ensure that institutional arrangements to oversee this function are established and capacitated, and beyond this, government also ought to ensure that all forest related carbon trading related projects benefits local communities and the country.
- 2.4.5 Forests in Zimbabwe provide a range of ecosystem services, including water regulation, soil conservation, and biodiversity conservation. These services are essential for human well-being and can also contribute to climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts.
- 2.4.6 Community participation is critical to the success of forestry and climate change initiatives in Zimbabwe. Engaging local communities in forest management and conservation can help to build support for these initiatives, as well as provide opportunities for livelihoods and economic development.
- 2.4.7 Forestry plays an important role in addressing climate change in Zimbabwe, and there is significant potential for the country to expand its efforts to protect and restore forests, promote sustainable forest management, and engage local communities in these efforts. Achieving this will require a coordinated effort from the government, private sector, and civil society to develop and implement effective policies and programs, mobilize investment and financing, and build capacity in forestry and climate change issues.

2.5 Biodiversity

- 2.5.1 In Zimbabwe and across Africa, biodiversity is closely linked to climate change, as changes in climate has significant impacts on the country and the region's diverse ecosystems and the species that depend on them hence the reason why this area ought to be given high priority going for COP28 in Dubai.
- 2.5.2 Zimbabwe's ecosystems provide a range of ecosystem services that are essential for human well-being, including water regulation, soil conservation, and pollination. These services are also critical for climate change adaptation and mitigation efforts. The continued change in climate is expected to have significant impacts on Zimbabwe's biodiversity, including changes in species distribution, habitat loss, and increased risk of extinction. This definitely is going to have significant implications for food security, human health, and other aspects of human well-being.

- 2.5.3 Zimbabwe has established a network of protected areas to conserve biodiversity and promote sustainable use of natural resources. These areas can also play a role in climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts, by sequestering carbon and providing ecosystem services.
- 2.5.4 International cooperation is critical to addressing the impacts of climate change on biodiversity in Zimbabwe. This includes support for conservation efforts, capacity building, and financing for adaptation and mitigation measures. Although it has been extremely difficult to access international support that furthers Zimbabwe agenda on addressing the impacts of climate change on biodiversity, COP28 country position has to be very clear on the need to reduce bureaucracy associated with some multilateral and bilateral funding streams available to support protection of biodiversity against the impacts of climate.
- 2.5.5 Overall, biodiversity is an important issue for climate change in Zimbabwe, and there is significant potential for the country to integrate biodiversity conservation into its climate change adaptation and mitigation efforts. Achieving this will require a coordinated effort from the government, private sector, and civil society to develop and implement effective policies and programs, mobilize investment and financing, and build capacity in biodiversity and climate change issues.

2.6 Waste

- 2.6.1 Zimbabwe faces significant challenges in managing both solid and liquid waste, particularly in urban areas where population growth and urbanization have led to increased waste generation.
- 2.6.2 Zimbabwe could position itself as a leader in waste reduction and recycling by setting ambitious targets and implementing effective waste management policies and programs. This could include promoting waste separation at source, establishing recycling facilities, and incentivizing businesses and households to reduce waste generation.
- 2.6.3 The efforts to improve its waste management infrastructure and build capacity in waste reduction and recycling building from the National Clean-up Campaign will require learning from others while seeking international partnerships. There is urgent need to explore and engage in long term partnerships with international organizations and donor agencies to develop and implement waste management projects and programs.
- 2.6.4 Highlighting the link between waste and climate change: along this workstream, Zimbabwe has an opportunity to position itself as a champion for the link between waste management and climate change through highlighting the significant emissions reductions

that can be achieved through effective waste reduction and recycling. This could involve promoting the use of renewable energy technologies in waste management and emphasizing the co-benefits of waste reduction and climate change mitigation.

- 2.6.5 Encouraging public participation: This achieved would position Zimbabwe as a country that values public participation in waste management decision-making processes. Operationally, this shall involve engaging with local communities and civil society organizations to develop and implement waste management policies and programs that are responsive to local needs and priorities. Recently, Zimbabwe ratified the Global Alliance on Green Economy spearheaded by the UAE Government and the World Green Economy Organization whose main objective is to build countries' capacities in transitioning to a green economy through (i) technical and technological assistance; (ii) establishment of a support platform to match project developers and finance providers; and (iii) enhance country exchanges on implementation, best practices and lessons learned.
- 2.6.6 Going for COP28 and overall consolidating the National Clean-up Campaign currently being spearheaded by HIS Excellency Cde E. D. Mnangagwa, Zimbabwe could position itself as a country that is committed to effective waste management and is taking action to address the challenges of waste generation and disposal. By highlighting its efforts to reduce waste and mitigate the impacts of climate change, Zimbabwe can contribute to the global effort to build a more sustainable and equitable future.

2.7 Built-Environment

- 2.7.1 The built environment plays an important role in addressing climate change in Zimbabwe, as buildings and infrastructure are significant sources of greenhouse gas emissions and are also vulnerable to the impacts of climate change.
- 2.7.2 Improving the energy efficiency of buildings and infrastructure is critical to reducing greenhouse gas emissions in Zimbabwe. This can involve measures such as improving insulation, using energy-efficient lighting and appliances, and promoting the use of renewable energy technologies.
- 2.7.3 Developing and implementing building codes and standards that promote energy efficiency and climate resilience is essential for addressing climate change in Zimbabwe. This can include measures such as building orientation, passive solar design, and the use of sustainable building materials.
- 2.7.4 Urban planning is an important tool for addressing climate change in Zimbabwe, particularly in rapidly urbanizing areas. This can involve measures such as promoting

compact, mixed-use development, improving public transportation, and preserving green spaces.

- 2.7.5 Water management is critical to building climate resilience in Zimbabwe, particularly in the face of increasing droughts and floods. This can involve measures such as rainwater harvesting, wastewater recycling, and the development of sustainable water supply systems.
- 2.7.6 Engaging local communities in the design and implementation of built environment initiatives is critical to their success. This can involve measures such as participatory planning processes, community-based monitoring and evaluation, and capacity building programs.
- 2.7.7 Zimbabwe's requires to develop and implement effective policies and programs, mobilise investment and financing, and build capacity in built environment and climate change issues in a bid to ensure a just transition. There is significant potential for the country to promote energy efficiency, climate resilience, and sustainable development through effective built environment policies and programs. Achieving this will require a coordinated effort from the government, private sector, and civil society.

2.8 E-mobility

- 2.8.1 Electric Mobility in developing countries has the capability to promote the transition to low-carbon transport systems, infrastructure development in the transport sector as well as transition to mass public transportation with the development of paradigm-shifting policies, regulatory frameworks and governance mechanisms.
- 2.8.2 Zimbabwe's Low Greenhouse Gas Emission Development Strategy and just transition LEDS, NDC, CTCN TA, Further resources to enhance pilot and for investment.

3.0 DEVELOPING A COP28 GOVERNMENT POSITION PAPER

3.1 Outline of Issues for the COP28 Government Position Paper

- 3.1.1 The position paper will present issues and positions on key agenda items including:
 - 3.1.1.1 Climate finance and technology
 - 3.1.1.2 Carbon credit Trade (Market mechanism of the Article 6 of the Paris Agreement)
 - 3.1.1.3 Operationalization of the Loss and Damage
 - 3.1.1.4 Mitigation Work Programme (MWP)
 - 3.1.1.5 Enhanced action on Adaptation
 - 3.1.1.6 Inclusiveness of vulnerable groups, indigenous and local communities
 - 3.1.1.7 Response and transparency matters
 - 3.1.1.8 Action for Climate Empowerment and Capacity Building issues
 - 3.1.1.9 Gender and Climate Change
 - 3.1.1.10 Work Programme on Agriculture
- 3.1.2 The Position paper for Zimbabwe will feed into the Africa Position Paper. The paper will present key negotiation positions and messages. Inputs from all consultative processes will be consolidated into the country's position paper. This position paper is by no means exhaustive. It represents the main issues and positions that should be taken into account by delegates to COP28. The paper should be read in conjunction with the Report on the 2023 Subsidiary Body Meetings to be attached.

3.2 Consultations

- 3.2.1 Provincial consultations (May to September 2023)
 - 3.2.1.1 CCMD will set up a multi-stakeholder team of those trained to facilitate training and awareness raising in all the 10 provinces
 - 3.2.1.2 With assistance from Provincial Development Coordinators, Strategic and key stakeholders in all provinces will be consulted, especially with respect to the deliverables of COP 27 and issues to focus on in the upcoming 28th Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
 - 3.2.1.3 Work with the media in all the 10 provinces with a variety of climate topics relevant to that province and communities discussed and shared, with position established.
- 3.2.2 National Consultative Meeting 1 (June 2023)

- 3.2.2.1 The Environment, Climate and Sustainable Development Institute, University of Zimbabwe in partnership with the Ministry responsible for Climate Change will convene the Climate Change and Development Conference in Zimbabwe 2023 which serves as a National Consultative Meeting.
- 3.2.2.2 The meeting will deliberate on the connections between climate change and development in Zimbabwe and the world in general. Ideas which can contribute to COP 28 processes and beyond will come out of the engagement. The engagement will take place at the University of Zimbabwe Innovation Hub.
- 3.2.3 Africa Climate Summit (September 2023, Nairobi Kenya)
 - 3.2.3.1 Africa, in particular, faces severe climate-related challenges, including drought, desertification, and increasing cyclones, leading to displacement, migration, and food crises. The continent is also disproportionately affected by the global temperature rise and is projected to experience escalating physical climate risks.
 - 3.2.3.2 At the Africa Climate Summit, leaders will be called upon to make pledges and commitments towards a comprehensive "Pledging and Commitment Framework". Zimbabwe will need to prepare for the summit in terms of its position.
- 3.2.4 National Consultative Meeting 2 (October 2023)
 - 3.2.4.1 A national consultative meeting will be convened in the form of a National Climate Change Conference. This engagement will take place in Bulawayo at the Zimbabwe International Trade Fair Grounds. The Ministry has a partnership with the company to host the event at their premises every year.

3.3 Stakeholders and Inclusion Approaches in Dialogues

- 3.3.1 Business Private Sector
 - 3.3.1.1 The Private Sector is important especially in low emissions development and promotion of environmentally friendly initiatives. They will be engaged on implementation of climate change mitigation interventions as expressed in the Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) and the Long-term Low Emission Development Strategy (LEDS).
- 3.3.2 Civil society in the Broadest Sense

3.3.2.1 Civil society complement government climate action efforts and will be engaged for implementation of agreed interventions. Civil Society contributes mostly to climate change adaptation, assisting in building resilience of communities. The Government will partner with them in all interventions related to climate change adaptation.

3.3.3 Meetings with Parliament Committee

3.3.3.1 The Parliament of Zimbabwe specifically the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Environment and Climate will be engaged especially on issues to do with the Climate Change Bill and any other matters that will require legal backing. The meetings with the Committee will be after elections scheduled to take place in August 2023. A capacity building programme will first be conducted for the Committee to raise awareness on climate change issues before embarking on the meetings.

3.3.4 Meetings with Out-going and Incoming Country Ambassadors

3.3.4.1 The MECW with the MoFAIT will engage out-going and incoming country Ambassadors in preparation for COP 28.

3.3.4.1.1 Outgoing Presidency of COP27

3.3.4.1.2 Incoming Presidency of COP28

3.3.4.1.3 Head of African Diplomatic Ambassadors

3.3.4.1.4 Other Ambassadors in Zimbabwe

3.3.5 Their views and recommendations will be captured in the country position paper towards COP 28.

3.3.6 Meeting with UN Agencies

3.3.6.1 UN Agencies will be engaged during the COP 28 Preparatory phase. UN Agencies to be engaged include, but not limited to, UNDP, UNICEF, FAO, UNEP, etc. Their views will be considered for inclusion in the country position paper towards COP 28.

4.0 PRESIDENTIAL SUMMIT

4.1 Plenary Participation

4.1.1 World Climate Action Summit

4.1.1.1 Currently the announcements of the participation of Heads of State and Government to the World Climate Action Summit on 01 and 02 December 2023, High Level Events, and respective protocol arrangements, including for the High-Level segment are yet to be announced. This section will be populated as guided by the agenda after announcement by the UNFCCC Secretariat.

4.2 Areas that could benefit from the Presidential Speech at COP28

4.2.1 Loss and damage, with emphasis on impacts of extreme events on Zimbabwe in the recent years.

4.2.2 Just Transition, where Zimbabwe will show case the mitigation potential as evidenced by emergency of off grid renewable energy production, climate smart agriculture, etc.

4.2.3 National Adaptation Planning, to call upon the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) to address the issues of the adaptation gap (finance for adaptation) after the completion of the development of the National Adaptation Plan (NAP).

4.2.4 Matters to carbon trading. Focus will be on guidance on cooperative approaches, the sustainable development mechanism and the carbon registry including the legal and regulatory frameworks.

4.2.5 Mitigation Work Programme, with an emphasis on Zimbabwe's conditional revised Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) and the need for substantial financing, technology transfer and capacity building.

4.3 Presidential Side Event Proposed for COP28

4.3.1 It is proposed that a Presidential side event at COP28 to be convened on the 7th of November 2023 under the them, "Sustainable Development-The Role of Carbon Trading in Driving African Economies" between 1400-1530hrs. Recently the Ministry facilitated a process to develop a national framework for carbon trading which was approved by Cabinet on the 16th of May 2023.

4.3.2 Carbon trading is a market-based mechanism that allows countries or companies to buy and sell carbon credits, which represent the right to emit a certain amount of greenhouse gases. The goal of carbon trading is to reduce overall greenhouse gas emissions by incentivizing establishments and individuals to reduce their emissions and rewarding those that do so.

4.3.3 The main purpose of this framework is to enhance the country's quest to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, mobilise climate finance and increase technology development and transfer from both the compliance and voluntary carbon markets. Project proponents, developers and investors in carbon trading activities in Zimbabwe shall therefore be guided in their decision making and project design by the intentions, purpose and guiding principles of this framework.

4.4 Possible Discussion Matters on Carbon Trade at COP28

4.4.1 How carbon trading could be used as a source of revenue for African countries. By reducing their emissions, companies in Africa could generate carbon credits that they could then sell on the global market. This would provide a new revenue stream for African countries, which could be used to fund sustainable development projects, such as renewable energy infrastructure.

4.4.2 How trading in carbon credits can incentivize African companies to adopt more sustainable practices. By putting a price on carbon emissions, companies would have a financial incentive to reduce their emissions and invest in sustainable technologies. This would not only reduce the environmental impact of African industries but also improve their competitiveness in the global market.

4.4.3 How carbon trading could help African countries to meet their international climate change commitments. Many African countries have committed to reducing their greenhouse gas emissions under the Paris Agreement. Carbon trading could help these countries to achieve their emissions reduction targets by providing a flexible and cost-effective way to reduce emissions.

4.4.4 Considering that carbon trading could play a significant role in propelling African economies towards a more sustainable future by providing a new source of revenue, incentivizing sustainable practices, and helping countries to meet their climate change commitments, there is high potential that the recently approved Carbon Credit Framework for Zimbabwe could help direct and regulate trading in carbon credits for the country to realise maximum benefits from the trade. COP28 provides a strategic platform for the Presidium to meet with potential investors in the sector and help unpack both the framework and the regulatory instrument.

4.5 Presidential Tour of the COP28 Exhibitions

4.5.1 The President will tour COP 28 Exhibitions with guidance from the Minister, Permanent Secretary and the Chief Director. Focus will be to assess how the various issues under exhibition done tails with thematic issues under negotiation for COP28.

4.6 Presidential Meeting Venue with Other Heads of State

4.6.1 The meeting will be guided by the agenda of the COP to be issued by the COP Presidency in consultation with the UNFCCC.

5.0 MINISTERIAL SEGMENT (NEGOTIATING STAKES)

5.1 Preparatory Meetings by Honourable Minister (AMCEN Meetings)

5.1.1 The Hon Minister will attend the Nineteenth Session of the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment (AMCEN) which will be held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from 14th to 18th August, 2023. He will be accompanied by officials from the Climate Change Management Department and the Environment and Natural Resources Department.

5.2 Briefing Cabinet on COP28 Preparations

5.2.1 The Hon Minister will brief the cabinet on COP 28 preparations guided by the step-by-step guide road to COP28 including presenting the proposed delegation for consideration and approval by the Cabinet.

5.3 Selecting Presidential Climate Change Projects for Showcasing at COP28

5.3.1 The Pavilion Committee with guidance from the Chief Director in consultation with the Cabinet will select flagship projects for showcasing at the Zimbabwe Pavilion.

6.0 INTERSESSIONAL MEETINGS IN BONN

6.1 Matters Referred to the Intersessional Meetings

6.1.1 The Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change convened the 58th meetings of the Subsidiary Bodies (SB58) in Bonn, Germany from 05 to 15 June 2022.

6.1.2 The Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) supports the work of the Conference of Parties (COP), the Conference of Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP) and the Conference of Parties serving as the

meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA) through the provision of timely information and advice on scientific and technological matters as they relate to the Convention, its Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement, and

- 6.1.3 At Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) delegates discussed the progress made by countries in implementing their nationally determined contributions (NDCs) and achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement. They also discussed the need for greater ambition and urgency in addressing climate change.
- 6.1.4 On adaptation the discussions focused on the need for greater support for adaptation efforts in developing countries, including financing, technology transfer, and capacity building.
- 6.1.5 On Climate finance the need for increased funding for climate action, particularly in developing countries, and the role of public and private finance in supporting the transition to a low-carbon economy.
- 6.1.6 On Loss and damage the discussions focused on the need for greater support for vulnerable countries and communities that are already experiencing the impacts of climate change, including through the provision of financial and technical assistance, and
- 6.1.7 On response measures the discussions focused on the need to address the social and economic impacts of climate change mitigation efforts, particularly in developing countries, and the need for support for a just transition to a low-carbon economy.

6.2 Africa Group of Negotiators

- 6.2.1 The Africa Group of Negotiators (Africa Group) was established at COP1 in Berlin, Germany in 1995 as an alliance of African member states that represents the interests of the region in the international climate change negotiations, with a common and unified voice. The Group comprises 54 Parties. The African Group is active in and supportive to all aspects of the climate change negotiating process, for instance regarding vulnerability, mitigation and adaptation to climate change.

6.3 G77 + China Group

- 6.3.1 Developing country Parties generally work through the Group of 77 to establish common negotiating positions. The G-77 and China Group is a diverse group with differing interests on climate change issues, individual developing country Parties also intervene in debates, as do groups within the G-77, such as the Africa Group, the Small Island Developing States and the group of Least Developed Countries.

6.4 Other Strategic Bodies to Negotiate Based on Strategic Interests

- 6.4.1 The Arab States is comprised of 22 member states namely Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen.
- 6.4.2 The Environmental Integrity Group (EIG), formed in 2000, comprises Mexico, Liechtenstein, Monaco, the Republic of Korea, Switzerland and Georgia.
- 6.4.3 The 27 members of the European Union meet in private to agree on common negotiating positions. The Party that holds the EU Presidency - a position that rotates every six months - then speaks for the European Union and its 27 member states. As a regional economic integration organization, the European Union itself can be, and is, a Party to the Convention. However, it does not have a separate vote from its members. Croatia is the latest country to join the European Union in 2013. The United Kingdom exited the European Union in 2020.
- 6.4.4 The 46 Parties defined as Least Developed Countries by the UN regularly work together in the wider UN system. They have become increasingly active in the climate change process, often working together to defend their particular interests, for example with regard to vulnerability and adaptation to climate change. Samoa, Equatorial Guinea, Vanuatu graduated from the LDCs and Angola is scheduled to graduate in 2024.
- 6.4.5 The Small Island Developing States (SIDS) is a coalition of some 40 low-lying islands, most of which are members of the G-77 that are particularly vulnerable to sea-level rise. SIDS Parties are united by the threat that climate change poses to their survival and frequently adopt a common stance in negotiations. They were the first to propose a draft text during the Kyoto Protocol negotiations calling for cuts in carbon dioxide emissions of 20% from 1990 levels by 2005.
- 6.4.6 The Umbrella Group is a coalition of Parties which formed following the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol. The Group is made up of Australia, Canada, Iceland, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Kazakhstan, Norway, Ukraine and the United States.
- 6.4.7 Several other groups also work together in the climate change process, including countries from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), a group of countries of Central Asia, Caucasus, Albania and Moldova (CACAM), the Cartagena Dialogue, the Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC), the BASIC Group (Brazil, South Africa, China India), the Like Minded Group, the Coalition for Rainforest Nations and the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America (ALBA in Spanish).

7.0 DIALOGUES AND MEETINGS OF GROUPS

7.1 Sectional

- 7.1.1 Youths Matters: Youth Climate Movement or International Youth Climate Movement refers to an international network of youth organisations that collectively aims to inspire, empower and mobilise a generational movement of young people to take positive action on climate change. The Official Children and Youth Constituency of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change known as YOUNGO deals with youth matters.
- 7.1.2 Children’s Issues: Children living in Africa, the most vulnerable continent, are the most at risk of the impacts of climate change, threatening their health, education, and protection. The Official Children and Youth Constituency of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change known as YOUNGO deals with children and youth matters. In addition, UNICEF also collaborates with different partners in children’s issues.
- 7.1.3 Women’s Matters: Women commonly face higher risks and greater burdens from the impacts of climate change in situations of poverty, and the majority of the world’s poor are women. Women’s unequal participation in decision-making processes and labour markets compound inequalities and often prevent women from fully contributing to climate-related planning, policy-making and implementation. Parties to the UNFCCC have recognized the importance of involving women and men equally in UNFCCC processes and in the development and implementation of national climate policies that are gender-responsive by establishing a dedicated agenda item under the Convention addressing issues of gender and climate change and by including overarching text in the Paris Agreement. Zimbabwe recently launched its Climate Change Gender Action Plan which recognizes the gap that exists between man and woman and foster gender sensitive climate change mitigation and adaptation actions.
- 7.1.4 People Living with Disabilities : In the Cancun Agreements, adopted at COP16 in 2010, Parties identified persons with disabilities as one of the segments of the population whose human rights are acutely affected by the impacts of climate change (decision 1/CP.16). In the Paris Agreement, the Parties further acknowledged that they should, “when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights,” including those owed to persons with disabilities. In a number of decisions and reports, UNFCCC bodies have also affirmed the importance of taking into account the needs of persons with disabilities and ensuring their engagement

in relation to capacity building, education, awareness, adaptation, and action for climate empowerment.

7.2 Intersectional

- 7.2.1 **Generational Issues:** A number of generational issues exist at country level and also across the continent requiring consideration as the Zimbabwe Group of Negotiators prepare for the UNFCCC COP28 including but not limited to intergenerational equity, climate education and awareness raising, technology and innovation transfer, gender and social equality, climate finance and investment:
- 7.2.2 **Intergenerational Equity:** Zimbabwe is alive to the fact that young people and future generations are facing significant impacts from climate change and related environmental issues, but have little voice and representation in decision-making processes. The Zimbabwe Group of Negotiators shall therefore strive to ensure that COP28 addresses the issue of intergenerational equity by ensuring youth's participation and seeking to address the concerns of vulnerable future generations. The Zimbabwe Group of Negotiators is also going to be constituted of Youths building up from the engagement dating back to COP26 that are going to be accredited with Party badges.
- 7.2.3 **Climate Education and Awareness-raising:** Climate education is crucial for building a sustainable future. Young people need to be aware of the impacts of climate change and related issues, including biodiversity loss and ecosystem degradation. The Zimbabwe Group of Negotiators at COP28 through its position paper is going to amplify Action for Climate Empowerment (ACE) through encouraging member states and civil society to promote the integration of climate-change education into formal and non-formal education systems, public awareness-raising, and citizen engagement initiatives. The delegation will push for the effective implementation of the Glasgow Work Programme on Action for Climate Empowerment and its Sharm El Sheikh ACE Action Plan. Financial and technical resources should be channelled to developing nations, including Zimbabwe, for implementation of ACE activities. At national level, there is need to mainstream climate change education into the primary and secondary education curricula. The Ministry responsible for Climate Change will take advantage of the ongoing primary and secondary education curriculum review process to ensure the mainstreaming is done.
- 7.2.4 **Technology and Innovation Transfer:** Access to clean and efficient technology is critical for reducing greenhouse gas emissions and building climate resilience. However, developing countries face significant barriers to accessing climate-friendly technologies. The Zimbabwe Group of Negotiators is therefore going to approach COP28 with a clear

position focused on promoting technology and innovation transfer and related capacity-building initiatives to support developing countries' climate action.

- 7.2.5 Climate Finance and Investment: Mobilizing sustainable finance and investment is critical for driving climate action and achieving global climate goals. From the ZGN position, COP28 should seek to enhance climate finance and investment mechanisms and encourage the Annex I Parties to support sustainable transition initiatives, especially in developing countries.

7.3 Gender Issues

- 7.3.1 Climate change disproportionately affects vulnerable communities, including women. Following the national launch of the Zimbabwe Gender Action Plan (GAP) in April 2023, the ZGN's position going to COP28 would be to address gender and social equality issues by pushing for an establishment of a funding mechanism to support operationalisation of GAPs meant to guide and foster gender-sensitive and inclusive programming to climate action and ensuring the participation and representation of vulnerable communities in decision-making processes.
- 7.3.2 Many countries have developed Gender Action Plans which will enable the mainstreaming of gender into Climate Change. This has been done through guidance and support from the UNFCCC process. Zimbabwe recently launched its Climate Change Gender Action Plan and now awaits its operationalisation and implementation however, the outstanding issue is on finance in terms of how the Gender Action Plan can be operationalised and how is the funding architecture going to be framed.
- 7.3.3 Zimbabwe's position going to COP28 is on establishment of a framework and mechanism for funding full implementation of the GAPS by developing countries.

7.4 Rural and Urban Divide

- 7.4.1 The rural and urban divide is an important issue that needs to be considered at the UNFCCC COP28, as it has significant implications for climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts.
- 7.4.2
- 7.4.3 Rural areas often have limited access to resources such as energy, water, and food, which can make it difficult for them to implement climate change mitigation and adaptation measures. Zimbabwe would like to see delegates at COP28, discussing ways to improve access to these resources in rural areas, such as through the use of renewable energy technologies and sustainable agriculture practices. Thrust would be around securing

funding for going to scale with solar powered piped water schemes in rural areas and Climate Smart Agriculture using the Pfumvudza concept.

- 7.4.4 Urban areas often have more developed infrastructure, which can make it easier to implement climate change mitigation and adaptation measures. Delegates at COP28 could discuss ways to improve infrastructure in rural areas, such as through the development of efficient and effective transportation systems and the provision of basic services like healthcare and education all anchored on the green growth concept.
- 7.4.5 Technology transfer especially on the African continent, the rural areas still lack access to the latest technologies and innovations, making it extremely difficult for the rural population to implement effective climate change mitigation and adaptation measures. At COP28, discuss ought to revolve around ways to improve technology transfer to rural areas, such as through the provision of training and capacity building programs.
- 7.4.6 Rural areas often have limited financial resources, which can make it difficult for them to implement climate change mitigation and adaptation measures. At COP28, delegates could discuss ways to improve funding for rural areas, such as through the provision of grants, loans, and other financial incentives. Most critical will be a discussion around adequate resourcing of the Adaptation Fund including urgent operationalisation of the Loss and Damage Fund approved at COP27 in Sharm El Sheik in Egypt.
- 7.4.7 The rural and urban divide is an important issue that needs to be addressed at COP28, as it has significant implications for the success of climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts. By addressing these issues, delegates can work towards a more equitable and sustainable future for all.

8.0 STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES AND FORMAT OF ENGAGEMENT

8.1 Principles of COP28 Engagement

The key and strategic pillars of engagement that the whole COP28 built-up process is going to use at country level is embedded in seven key principles summarised below:

- 8.1.1 Alignment of interests: the whole COP preparatory process understands that it is important to identify and align the interests of all stakeholders who shall be involved in COP28 as part of the Zimbabwe Group of Negotiators (ZGN). This involves understanding the motivations and objectives of each stakeholder and finding common ground to work towards a shared goal and country position.
- 8.1.2 Effective Communication: this is essential for building trust and maintaining engagement among members of the Zimbabwe Group of Negotiators. A strategy that the planning team shall employ to strengthen communication include regular meetings, clear and transparent communication channels, and the use of appropriate communication tools.
- 8.1.3 Effective Communication: this is essential for building trust and maintaining engagement among members of the Zimbabwe Group of Negotiators. A strategy that the planning team shall employ to strengthen communication include regular meetings, clear and transparent communication channels, and the use of appropriate communication tools.
- 8.1.4 Collaboration: collaboration among members of the negotiation team is critical for achieving the goals of Zimbabwe and the Africa Group of Negotiators at COP28. This involves working together to identify and structure country positions including proposing solutions that benefit all stakeholders, all sectors and the region.
- 8.1.5 Consensus Building: consensus building is essential for decision-making in a multi-stakeholder group. Within the framework of COP28 planning process this shall involve identifying common ground and finding ways to address any disagreements or conflicts that arise especially considering that the Zimbabwe Group of Negotiators to COP28 is going to be multi-stakeholder and multi-sectoral with negotiators pooled from the government constituency (both central and local government), civil society, development partners, private sector, media fraternity, youths etc.
- 8.1.6
- 8.1.7 Accountability: each negotiator and/or stakeholder who is going to constitute the official Zimbabwe Group of Negotiators shall be held accountable for their commitments and actions. The planning process and roadmap shall therefore involve the setting-up of clear expectations and means of monitoring progress towards achieving the goals of the country delegation.

- 8.1.8 Continuous Improvement: the Zimbabwe Group of Negotiators shall regularly evaluate its performance and seek feedback from stakeholders to identify areas for improvement. This involves being open to engagements and feedback and making necessary changes to improve the effectiveness of the group.
- 8.1.9 Informing: at each stage there shall be education and awareness as a in-built mechanisms to facilitate continuity, learning, succession planning.

8.2 Negotiations and dialogue

- 8.2.1 Meeting across the variety of COP28 will be negotiated in designated meeting rooms. The accredited and approved negotiators will participate directly in the negotiations;
- 8.2.2 Other accredited parties will be observers in the meeting rooms;
- 8.2.3 There will be rooms dedicated to presentation of scientific papers, ideas and related positions that will be approved through the UNFCCC secretariat (the website application that is downloadable will provide a lot of the details)

8.3 Media Coverage

- 8.3.1 The Media is important in covering climate change issues and disseminating such matters to the general public.
- 8.3.2 The media will be engaged both in pre - and post-COP preparatory processes. The meetings/ conferences will be broadcasted in national media platforms, both print and electronic.
- 8.3.3 The Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation and other Private media outlets will be engaged through the Ministry of Information and Publicity to cover all events leading up to COP 28.

8.4 Media Training

- 8.4.1 Training of media practitioners will be organised.
- 8.4.2 The training workshops will be to enlighten media practitioners in Zimbabwe on basic facts about climate change is, the impacts of climate change in Zimbabwe and around the world as well as how the country and the world are responding to the change.
- 8.4.3 Media practitioners will be introduced to the COP Processes, its importance, relevance and areas of national interest which must be covered.

8.5 Artists

8.5.1 The Ministry will engage a climate change ambassador who will disseminate climate change information including national and international climate change engagements through art.

9.0 NEGOTIATORS

9.1 Concerns

9.1.1 The success of any COP negotiations depends on the quality and endurance of its negotiators. At COP27 many were found wanting and contributed least or nothing. A few remained committed to the last hour of the negotiations, many having left for home or consumed by side activities and failed to recognise why they were at COP27. This is not going to be repeated at COP28, and this roadmap is aimed at ensuring that the needful is done without favours.

9.2 Selection of Negotiators

The following criteria was used in selecting negotiators:

- 9.2.1 Current negotiators with a track record
- 9.2.2 Assessment of COP 27 performance based on their reports submitted timely
- 9.2.3 Academic qualifications and relevance to the negotiation area
- 9.2.4 Knowledge of climate change and the negotiation processes

9.3 Training of the COP28 Negotiators

9.3.1 Training of all Negotiators

- 9.3.1.1 Trainings will be organised for trainee negotiators. The training will be on basic diplomacy issues in negotiations such as procedures, protocol, dressing, language and any other issues relevant.
- 9.3.1.2 The trainee negotiators will be provided with a history of the negotiations on the multilateral environmental agreements with a specific focus on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and its Paris Agreement, outlining the key decisions adopted, agenda items discussed at each COP and what is covered.
- 9.3.1.3 The country's position will be well outlined and why negotiators should make sure all their contributions are in line with that position. The trainee negotiators will be introduced to seasoned negotiators for all agenda items and exposed to

key climate-related policy and strategy documents including previous COP decisions for reference purposes.

9.3.2 Training Manual is Updated

9.3.2.1 A manual will be developed and this will be used during the planned training for negotiators.

9.3.3 Funding of Approved Negotiators for COP28 Participation

9.3.3.1 Organisations in a position to avail funding are encouraged to support their trained negotiators to attend COP 28. The Government will however assist in mobilising resources to support participation of selected negotiators.

10.0 NEGOTIATORS' PLATFORMS

10.1 Ministry Technical Committee

Made up of focal persons from key and relevant ministries as follows:

- 10.1.1 Ministry of Environment, Climate and Wildlife
- 10.1.2 Ministry of Energy and Power Development
- 10.1.3 Ministry of Women Affairs
- 10.1.4 Ministry of Finance and Economic Development
- 10.1.5 Ministry of Agriculture
- 10.1.6 Ministry of Industry and Commerce
- 10.1.7 Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education
- 10.1.8 Ministry of Lands, Agriculture, Fisheries, Water and Rural Development

10.2 Stakeholder Technical Committee

Made up of stakeholders who are key and relevant in the COP process including:

- 10.2.1 Zimbabwe Investment Development Agency (ZIDA)
- 10.2.2 Zimbabwe International Trade Fair Company
- 10.2.3 Zimbabwe Agriculture Society
- 10.2.4 Youth Climate Groups
- 10.2.5 Civil Society Climate Change Working Groups
- 10.2.6 Business Council for Sustainable Development in Zimbabwe
- 10.2.7 Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries
- 10.2.8 Faith Based Organisations
- 10.2.9 People with Disabilities Groups

10.2.10 Research and Learning Institutions

10.3 Communities Participation

10.3.1 MECW will popularise and encourage communities to exhibit at the Green Zone as an opportunity to connect with other communities with similar experiences.

10.3.2 Complement government efforts and follow relevant side events and programmes in the green zone.

11.0 CLIMATE ACTION HUB FOR COP28

11.1 Theme for the Pavilion

11.1.1 Zimbabwe will have a Pavilion at COP28 and the theme for the Pavilion will be proposed and decided at the first sitting of the COP28 technical committee.

11.2 Design of the Pavilion

11.2.1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs will be consulted through the embassy in UAE for assessment of the COP28 venue and exhibition centre at the Blue Zone;

11.2.2 A stand designer will be procured following successful allocation of the stand. Assistance will be sought from the Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education, Innovation, Science and Technology Development.

11.3 Planning Committee for the Pavilion

11.3.1 The planning committee for the pavilion will be set up. It will comprise of individuals from the following ministries, departments and agencies:

11.3.1.1 Office of President and Cabinet

11.3.1.2 Ministry of Environment, Climate and Wildlife (MECW) comprising, (i) the Permanent Secretary's Office, (ii) the Climate Change Management Department, (iii) the Environment and Natural Resources Department, and (iv) the Tourism and Hospitality Management Department.

11.3.1.3 MECW's Agencies including Zimbabwe Tourism Authority; Forestry Commission and Environmental Management Agency

11.3.1.4 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

11.3.1.5 Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education, Innovation, Science and Technology Development

11.3.1.6 Ministry of Energy and Power Development

- 11.3.1.7 Ministry of Industry and Commerce
- 11.3.1.8 Academia e.g UZ, NUST & CUT, MUAST, GZU, and tertiary institutions with climate related programmes
- 11.3.1.9 Private Sector e.g Business Council for Sustainable Development
- 11.3.1.10 The Media Fraternity

11.4 Size of the Pavilion

- 11.4.1 Communication has been commenced with the UNFCCC and an expression of interest was communicated for a stand measuring 150 to 200 square metres.
- 11.4.2 The aim is to surpass COP27 pavilion and have a relevant pavilion that attracts partnerships, businesses, collaborators and supporters in Zimbabwe's climate actions.
- 11.4.3 Ensure that there is wide availability of space to government exhibition, while also giving space to the private sector, youths groups, women's groups and others
- 11.4.4 Make the pavilion available for side events organised by Zimbabwe, African partners and others who would like to engage the participating public

11.5 Meetings at the Pavilion

- 11.5.1 Meetings will be organised at the Pavilion: A schedule of events will be made available. All MDAs interested in conducting side events at the Pavilion should communicate in advance. A concept note should be communicated to the Pavilion Secretariat detailing the name of the event, purpose, nature of participants and any other relevant information. Those willing to conduct closed door meetings in the Pavilion meeting room should also communicate well in advance.
- 11.5.2 Internal Meetings (for Negotiators): Negotiators meet after every 2 days to update each other on the agenda items they will be following. All Negotiators will meet in the Pavilion Meeting Room at a date and time to be advised.
- 11.5.3 External Meetings. All external meetings have to be hosted at the Pavilion ought to be communicated well in advance and clearance should be provided by the Pavilion manager ahead of the meeting.

11.6 Costs for the Pavilion

- 11.6.1 The Government of Zimbabwe will cover costs related to the Pavilion including stand booking and design. However, all MDAs willing to exhibit at the Pavilion shall contribute to the cost related to the Pavilion. Calculations will be done and a figure agreed upon. The

Zimbabwe Tourism Authority will avail its Account to handle funds related to costs for the Pavilion.

11.6.2 Stakeholders who will wish to use the Zimbabwe Climate Action Hub Pavilion will pay for the costs as determined by the committee.

11.7 Management of the Pavilion

11.7.1 The Pavilion will be managed by the Pavilion Manager and the technical committee to be established (this will be known as the Pavilion Committee) once the stand is procured. No one will be allowed to do any other activity at the Pavilion without approval of the Pavilion Committee.

12.0 COP28 ZONES

12.1 Blue Zone

12.1.1 The Blue Zone is a UNFCCC managed site, open to accredited party and observer delegates. It hosts the formal negotiations across the two weeks of the conference, as well as the World Climate Action Summit, the country pavilions, presidency events, and hundreds of side events including panel discussions, round tables, and cultural events. Only UNFCCC-accredited participants such as Parties, world leaders, media, and observers will have access to the Blue Zone.

12.2 Green Zone

12.2.1 The Green Zone is open to delegates and guests of the Blue Zone, Public and Private Sector, NGOs and the General Public. The Green zone is a platform where business community, youth, civil and indigenous societies, academia, artists and fashion communities from all over the world can express themselves and their voices would be heard. COP 27 delegates are urged to book their accommodation as soon as possible.

13.0 ACCREDITATION FOR COP28

13.1 When to Accredit

13.1.1 Accreditation is done when the Online Registration System of the UNFCCC is open i.e., after the notification to Parties has been issued.

13.2 Requirements for Accreditation

13.2.1 It should be noted by all members of the Zimbabwe Group of Negotiators that accreditation as a party delegate at the UNFCCC Conference of Parties (COP) means that

a member has been granted official status to participate in the COP. This status means a member is attending the Conference of Parties sessions, participating in negotiations, and engaging in other official activities related to the COP representing Zimbabwe.

13.2.2 All Party delegates must be nominated and confirmed in the Online Registration System of the UNFCCC secretariat. Accreditation is done by the UNFCCC Focal Point; Director Climate Change Management Department. For successful accreditation, the following requirements are needed:

13.2.2.1 Full name, passport number, copy of passport bio-page,

13.2.2.2 Letter from host Institution providing reasons why the person wants to go; and,

13.2.2.3 Proof of financial support

13.2.3 Accreditation as a party delegate is an important status, as it allows countries and organizations to participate in the decision-making processes that shape global climate policy. It also provides an opportunity to share experiences and best practices, build partnerships, and contribute to the global effort to address the urgent challenge of climate change. Access to the conference centre requires the presentation of a valid conference badge issued by the UNFCCC Secretariat.

13.2.4 Overall, accreditation as a party delegate at the UNFCCC COP28 is a significant recognition of a country, organization or individual's commitment to addressing climate change and contributing to the global effort to build a more sustainable and equitable future.

13.3 Expectation from Each Accredited Delegate

13.3.1 The delegate should be following a specific workstream(s)

13.3.2 Be guided in negotiations by the country's priorities

13.3.3 Operate within the limits of the agreed country position in terms of climate negotiations.

13.3.4 Attend and contribute in all delegation meetings

13.3.5 Not to be associated with demonstrations or any activity that is against the conduct of party delegates in negotiations.

13.4 Approval of the Accreditation

13.4.1 Approval for accreditation is done when an official has submitted all the required documentation and the UNFCCC Focal Point is satisfied.

13.5 Media Accreditation

13.5.1 Media provides timely, accurate and analysed information on the COP discussions, the politics behind it as well as the economics and development implications. Media brings different perspectives together. For accreditation, media personnel should provide the following:

- 13.5.1.1 Letter from media organisation (at least 1 month before the conference starts)
- 13.5.1.2 A copy of a valid media badge
- 13.5.1.3 Links to climate change articles published in the press
- 13.5.1.4 Proof of funding

14.0 KEY LIAISON ENTITIES FOR COP28

14.1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

14.1.1 The Ministry is important in protocol issues. It implements Zimbabwe's foreign policy; promotes Zimbabwe's economic, political, social and cultural interests; ensures compliance with Continental and Regional Treaties, Agreements and protocols; provides timeous advice on foreign policy matters and implements policies in line with regional and continental integration.

14.1.2 The Ministry facilitates the issuance of all official documents such as ordinary, service and diplomatic passports. it will play a crucial role in the issuance of Visas by the United Arab Emirates.

14.2 Office of the President and Cabinet

14.2.1 The OPC is mandated to provide strategic policy direction, coordination, monitoring, advisory oversight, planning and realization of efficient service delivery of government ministries and departments. The Entity will make sure there is efficient delivery by those who manage to attend COP28.

14.3 UN Ambassador in New York

14.3.1 New York houses the United Nations Secretariat which Zimbabwe is a member of. The UN Ambassador will be a key person to provide relevant information from the United Nations especially with regards to the Leaders' Summit held prior the main conference.

14.4 Zimbabwe Ambassador to the UAE

14.4.1 The Ambassador is key in pre- and actual COP28 duration. The Pavilion Committee links with the Office on a regular basis to get an update on the Pavilion especially when the

Pavilion Designer is procured. The Ambassador is on the ground and he provides real information. The Office will be critical on the issuance of Visas to Zimbabwean nationals who will participate at COP 28.

15.0 RESOURCES MOBILISATION

15.1 Co-operating Partners

15.1.1 There are several opportunities for cooperating partners and private sector funding for COP28 delegates from Zimbabwe. By engaging with international organizations, private sector companies and climate finance mechanisms, Zimbabwe can access funding to support its group of negotiators at COP28: Some of the partners worth pursuing include:

- 15.1.1.1 The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
- 15.1.1.2 World Bank
- 15.1.1.3 The Global Environment Facility
- 15.1.1.4 Companies in the renewable energy, agriculture and forestry sectors
- 15.1.1.5 FCDO
- 15.1.1.6 UNICEF
- 15.1.1.7 UN Women
- 15.1.1.8 World Health Organization
- 15.1.1.9 UNEP
- 15.1.1.10 UNFCCC

15.2 Private Sector Funding

15.2.1 The private sector is key to the financing of mitigation action, and developed country businesses are key to implementation Through COP28, Zimbabwe seeks to match local businesses with international private sector towards implementation of climate action.

15.2.2 The private sector will be encouraged to meet and discuss strategies towards COP28 and beyond and the carbon credit framework, has provided an opportunity for their engagement among themselves and with government.

15.2.3 The private sector can will fund their participation at COP28, and encouraged to mobilise and allow representation across sector.

16.0 TRAVEL AND LOGISTICAL ISSUES

16.1 Visa Processing

16.1.1 The UAE Government has authorized an electronic, free of charge Special Entry Permit for all UNFCCC-registered COP28 UAE event attendees, also known as the COP28 UAE Visa. Once one has completed the UNFCCC registration process and received a

UNFCCC registration confirmation email with a link to apply for the COP28 UAE Visa the next steps will then be, through the link:

16.1.1.1 Visit the visa portal,

16.1.1.2 Fill out the form,

16.1.1.3 Upload the required documents, and

16.1.1.4 Submit it for approval.

16.1.2 Once approved, one will receive the visa confirmation email with a link to download COP28 UAE Visa. All foreign participants entering the United Arab Emirates (UAE) must have a passport which is valid for a minimum period of 6 months from your date of entry into the UAE. It is mandatory for all foreign UNFCCC-registered participants entering the UAE to apply for the COP28 UAE Visa, prior to arrival, using the visa application link within the UNFCCC registration confirmation email.

16.1.3 Processing of the COP28 UAE Visa application may take up to 72 hours after submission. Participants are therefore strongly encouraged to take the necessary steps to apply, as soon as their UNFCCC registration is confirmed. Your application status can be checked using the link in your visa application confirmation email (received after submitting the visa application). To facilitate a seamless visa issuance process, it is imperative to provide all the required information including the UNFCCC registration code on the COP28 UAE Visa application portal. All enquiries regarding visa arrangements should be addressed directly to visas@unfccc.int.

16.2 Accommodation for Delegates

16.2.1 A wide choice of accommodation options to suit any budget are available across the United Arab Emirates. The UAE government, through its accommodation provider Bnetwork, has secured several hotel rooms in Dubai at competitive rates. The UAE government has published the booking portal link via the COP28 official site: <https://cop28.com/en/blue-zone-visit>. Please submit your requests through the booking portal Bnetwork will review all requests and contact with the applicant to confirm allocation and the necessary terms and conditions.

16.2.2 Delegations are encouraged to submit their requests to Bnetwork as soon as possible to facilitate smooth accommodation arrangements. It should be noted that the UAE Government will not cover the cost of accommodation for delegates. The UAE, in close collaboration with the UNFCCC, will be in touch with funded Party delegates regarding accommodation arrangements.

16.3 Transportation of officials and delegates

16.3.1 The UAE government will provide free metro travel (in Dubai) for COP28 UAE accredited attendees. Delegates are encouraged to use Dubai Metro to reach Expo City Metro Station via the Metro Red Line, DXB Airport, and the main hotels and tourist attractions in Dubai. Dubai Metro Operational hours are from 05:00-00:00. Trips can be planned at <https://www.rta.ae/wps/portal/rta/ae/public-transport/timetable#DubaiMetro>. COP28 UAE will provide free of charge public transport throughout COP28 UAE for Blue Zone delegates. NOL Cards will be delivered during COP28 registration at Expo Site.

16.3.2 Free of charge bus shuttles will be provided between Expo 2020 Metro Station and Green Zone entrances. Four bus stops will be operational nearby to the main entrance.

17.0 PROCEDURES FOR MANAGEMENT OF COP28

17.1 Reporting regularly

17.1.1 Monthly progress reports. Once preparatory meetings resume, there will be monthly progress reports from different committees which are going to be established.

17.1.2 Reporting will be done to the Chief Director regularly especially after completion of any preparatory meeting through submission of minutes and alerts on key matters that arises for noting and consideration.

17.2 Inclusive approaches

17.2.1 A technical committee convened by CCMD shall meet for the review of the state of preparedness towards COP28 as guided by this manual. Any additional matters shall be included in this manual to reflect an inclusive approach

17.2.2 Stakeholders are encouraged to submit their position papers through the CCMD for engagement into the government policy positions.

18.0 ANNEXES

18.1 Timeline of the Conference of Parties (COPs)

COP-1, Berlin, 1995: in Berlin it resulted in the Berlin Mandate with binding emissions targets and timetables being introduced for the first time. Developing countries were disappointed with the lack of immediate action the mandate presented.

COP-2, Geneva, 1996: the policies within the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's (IPCC) second assessment were endorsed by parties, being described as 'the most comprehensive and authoritative assessment of the science of climate change' [4].

COP-3: Kyoto, 1997: the Kyoto Protocol was the first ever binding climate targets, otherwise known as QELROs (Quantified Emission Limitation and Reduction Objectives). QELROs place a maximum limit on Annex I countries emitting the six major GHGs. Two flexibility mechanisms were also outlined. The first of these was a Joint Implementation Project (JI). This allowed Annex I countries to be a part of an emissions reduction programme in another Annex I country as an alternative to reducing domestic emissions. The second mechanism, a Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) allowed Annex I countries to invest in a developing country's green infrastructure in place of reducing domestic emissions. USA and wanted a pre-condition for developing countries to reduce emissions. While the Kyoto Protocol was adopted at COP-3, its requirement of 55 signatures meant that it did not enter into force until 2004, 7 years after COP-3, when Russia signed.

COP-4, Buenos Aires, 1998: the Buenos Aires Plan of Action was established so as to promote member state cooperation. The plan aided the transfer of technology and services to developing nations. Negotiations on the technology transfer into developing countries also continued into COP-5. Parties also agreed that the finances of the COP would be discussed every four years.

COP-5, Bonn, 1999: was a technical meeting, delegates left Bonn with a mandate to negotiate the finer details of the Kyoto Protocol.

COP-6: The Hague, 2000: described as a 'make or break time for the planet', it provided an opportunity for disagreements regarding the Flexibility Mechanisms to be resolved. Specifically, what should be described as an acceptable emissions reduction mechanism. Groups such as the European Union and Hungary favoured a smaller range of acceptable mechanisms, whereas the Group of 77 approach included, amongst others, nuclear energy investment. Other outstanding issues involved "carbon sinks and whether reforestation should be classed as an acceptable emissions-reduction project". Placing a limit on the amount of emissions reductions met through the mechanisms was also discussed. The COP showed the need for credible, sustainable solutions to the climate emergency.

COP-7, Marrakesh, 2001: In 2001, Marrakesh hosted COP-7. After COP-6 part two, the detailed rules regarding Kyoto were adopted and named the Marrakesh Accords [12]. A Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) was also established to finance adaptation and technology transfer projects.

COP-8: New Delhi, 2002

At COP-8 in 2002, the Delhi Ministerial Declaration was adopted, calling for developed countries to transfer technology to developing countries. Russia's hesitation, in part, characterised COP-8 [13]. Like all protocols, Kyoto could only enter into force once it was ratified by 55 countries, including those responsible for 55 per cent of the developed world's 1990 carbon dioxide emissions. With the US and Australia not ratifying, Russia was required to meet the ratification criteria and was able to

delay the process [14]. It was not until 2004, two years after COP-7 that Russia signed the Kyoto Protocol.

COP-9: Milan, 2003: new emissions reporting guidelines based on IPCC recommendations were adopted. The Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) and the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) were further developed [15].

COP-10: Buenos Aires, 2004: the Buenos Aires Plan of Action was adopted in 2004. 2004 was also marked by Russia, alongside Canada, formally ratifying the Kyoto Protocol. Parties also began discussing post-Kyoto mechanisms at COP-10, specifically how to allocate emission reduction obligations following 2012 when Kyoto's first commitment period was due to end [16].

COP-11, Montreal, 2005: COP-11 marked the Kyoto Protocol being formally entered into force. As well as hosting the 11th conference of the parties, 2005 was the year of the first Meeting of the Parties (MOP), a meeting of the developed countries who had agreed to the Kyoto Protocol. A new working group focussing on commitments post-2012 was also established

COP-12: Nairobi, 2006: focussed on ways in which to make the CDM more accessible as well as how to maintain momentum in discussions surrounding post-2012 climate policies. Delegates at COP-12 were, however, criticised for their concerns about possible economic and competitiveness losses, resulting in little discussion of reducing emissions.

COP-13: Bali, 2007: with the Kyoto Protocol being in force for two years, negotiations on its successor dominated the conference. 2007 marked the start of the Bali Road Map towards COP-15 when a framework for climate change mitigation post-2012 was expected. The Bali conference also resulted in the adoption of the Adaptation Fund which would help vulnerable countries adapt to the impacts of climate change. As well as this, an agreement on a system of payments for developing countries who were conserving tropical forests was established.

COP-14: Pozanri, 2008: negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol's successor rolled over to COP-14 and continued to dominate discussions. Delegates agreed on principles for the financing of the Adaptation Fund and approved the incorporation of forestprotection within the fund [20].

COP-15, Copenhagen, 2009: COP-15 marked the end of the Bali Road Map and resulted in the drafting of the Copenhagen Accord. The accord asserted climate change as one of the greatest challenges of modern times and declared that global warming should be limited to 2°C [21]. The Copenhagen Accord, however, was not legally binding and did not commit countries to any binding commitments for CO₂ emission reductions or, more notably, call on them to agree on a legally-binding successor to the Kyoto Protocol [22]. In spite of this, 114 countries did agree to the accord, showing commitment to the cause.

COP-16, Cancún, 2010: Water was a key focus of Cancun. Particularly its scarcity, cleanliness and sustainability in the developing world. Parties also established a Green Climate Fund (GCF) which would distribute US\$100 billion per year to help poorer countries adapt to the impacts of climate change. However, there were no talks on how this money would be raised [23, 24]. Further to this, at Cancún, 76 countries – developed and developing – also made pledges to control emissions.

COP-17, Durban, 2011: On the final day of negotiations at Durban, delegates agreed that by 2015 there would be a legally binding deal involving all countries to the UNFCCC. The deal, referred to as the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, was to be the first of its kind. It included developing countries as well as the US (who had not ratified the Kyoto Protocol) and would take effect by 2020. Progress was also made on developing a GCF. Some responses to COP-17 noted the good progress made but outlined that the talks did not remove the world from the pathway of 4°C of warming.

COP-18, Doha, 2012: the Doha Climate Gateway was produced as a result of COP-18, aiming to launch a new commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol. This second period was announced as running from 2012 until 2020 [26]. However, it did not enter into force, receiving only 34 signatures. As of 2019, 124 countries have accepted the amendments to Doha. There was little progression on the funding of the GCF at COP-18.

COP-19, Warsaw, 2013: at Warsaw, the UNFCCC created a mechanism for Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) to be submitted before COP-21 which would take place in Paris in 2015. COP-19 also saw the proposal of the Warsaw Mechanism. The mechanism addressed developing countries' loss and damages associated with climate change. Despite this proposal, and the mechanism for INDCs marking the very start of the Paris Agreement, COP-19 was greatly criticised. This was because of the lack of commitment Poland had with regards to reducing fossil fuels, particularly coal at the time.

COP-20, Lima, 2014: it was announced that pledges made by developing and developed nations led to GCF funding which exceeded the target of \$10bn dollars. The Lima Ministerial Declaration on Education and Awareness was brought to the fore, formally calling on governments to put climate change into school curricula for the first time [29].

COP-21, Paris, 2015: the Paris Agreement was announced as the Kyoto Protocol's successor. The Paris Agreement, with 195 signatories, was to fully replace the Kyoto Protocol and govern climate change reduction measures from 2020. The Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement was established in the Durban Platform's place to aid the agreement's future entry into force. Countries aimed to keep global warming as far below 2°C as possible. Some criticized Paris, noting that significant sections are promises, not binding commitments. However, countries were, and continue to be, expected to comply with their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). NDCs play a central role in the success of the Paris Agreement and force nations to become accountable for their emissions. Total transparency is expected when looking for information regarding whether each nation sticks to, and achieves, their NDCs.

COP-22, Marrakech, 2016: The COP returned to Marrakech as USA threatened the withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. Despite this, parties at the COP approved a five-year work plan that will see countries start to formally address the non-economic impacts of climate change. The Climate and Development Knowledge Network (CDKN) was also established, providing a guide for NDC implementation in less developed countries. Discussions took place regarding the Adaptation Fund; many nations argued that it should also be applied to the Paris Agreement to ensure it remains a political priority.

COP-23, Fiji, 2017: the first COP since the US announced its departure from the Paris Agreement. During COP-23, the Powering Past Coal Alliance was also launched. While the alliance outlines that a coal phase out is needed no later than 2030, it did not commit anyone to a particular phase out date.

COP-24, Katowice, 2018: progress was made on negotiating the Paris Agreement's rulebook at Katowice. However, disagreements persisted with the rules for voluntary market mechanisms. This led to some negotiations rolling over to the COP scheduled for 2019.

COP-25, Madrid, 2019: it was shaped as an 'Ambition COP', serving to finalise the Paris Agreement's rulebook ready for it to take effect in 2020. Rules for coming to an agreement on the carbon markets to make the case for raising ambition in 2020' The coronavirus pandemic disrupted the meeting.

COP-26, Glasgow, 2021: this was a decisive COP that sets a path to 1.5-degree commitment by 2030. Countries submitted their NDCs and would review them on an annual basis. The target of US\$100 billion that was not achieved by 2020, was escalated. The USA re-joined the UNFCCC and private foundations made financial commitments. The phase down of coal to Low Emissions Development Strategies and promoting of renewable energy options was also a key commitment.

COP-27, Sharm El Sheik, 2022